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On May 10, the LTTE launched three major attacks in the east. They sank a naval cargo ship within the highly defended Trincomalee harbour. In addition they launched a series of mortar attack in Damana, a Sinhalese-inhabited part of the Ampara district and exploded a bomb in a restaurant in the middle of the Sinhalese-inhabited Ampara town killing over a dozen civilians and injuring many more. These incidents appear to have been timed by the LTTE to cast a pall of fear and apprehension over the voters as they prepared to vote at the decisive Eastern Provincial elections set for that same day.

The LTTE, of course, was not a direct participant in those elections that both the government and opposition had turned into a virtual referendum on the future of politics in the war torn North and East of the country. Although the LTTE have registered a political party with the Election Commissioner’s Department it has gone into long hibernation. The LTTE’s inability to develop a viable political party indicates a continuing preference for reliance upon military rather than political means of conflict resolution. The TNA, which is the political party that is closest to the LTTE, and which is believed to be subservient to the LTTE’s political decisions, also did not contest the elections.

The TNA claimed that its decision not to contest the Eastern Provincial Council election was due to their objection to the de-merger of the Eastern Province from the North-East Province as decided by the Supreme Court. It is also likely that potential TNA candidates would have felt vulnerable to assassination by the TMVP, the breakaway LTTE group in the east, who have retained many of their LTTE characteristics. If they had contested the provincial election, the TNA, which swept the Tamil vote at the last Parliamentary election in 2004, could have made a big difference to the balance between the government and opposition.

The LTTE’s multi-pronged attacks on government and civilian targets in the east on the day of the elections would have reminded the people in the east of the LTTE’s continued presence and destructive power in the east. It would have served to confirm the worst fears of the non-Tamil majority in the east, comprising Muslims and Sinhalese, that the LTTE continues to be an organization that is willing to engage in terror attacks against them, as they have done in the past. While some would have seen in this the need for the government to engage in political negotiations with the LTTE, others would have seen the need to militarily eliminate them on the lines that the government has been proposing.

DISADVANTAGED OPPOSITION

There were doubts about the possibility of the government winning the eastern elections. About 80 percent of the eastern population is equally divided between the Tamil and Muslim communities. As the present government is closely associated with the forces of Sinhalese nationalism, there seemed to be every likelihood of the Tamil and Muslim vote going in large measure to the opposition. A defeat for the government would have indicated that the ethnic minorities disapproved of the government’s strategy and actions in the war-torn North and East.

However, the results of the election have shown otherwise. A majority of the Tamil and Muslim voters appear to have supported the government. The implications of this are significant. It would legitimize the government’s argument that the Tamil and Muslim population in the east is prepared to support, or at least acquiesce, in its strategy of military elimination of the LTTE to be followed by reconstruction and a restoration of the electoral process.

Critics of the government, including election monitoring groups, have argued that the opposition parties were disadvantaged from the outset of the election campaign, and that conditions of free and fair elections did not prevail during the entire course of the election campaign and poll. The free and fairness of an election cannot be determined solely by considering what occurs on election day, as there are a number of other factors which can affect citizens and political parties\' ability to effectively participate in the democratic process.

The period of the election campaign was marked by undercurrents of intimidation although there was low overt violence during the campaign itself. As a result, campaigning was carried out under a security environment not conducive to a free and fair election. One of the most controversial features of the elections was that the TMVP, which is a former militant group, continued to retain its arms on the grounds of self defence. The basic requirement for a free and fair election were not met. One of the contesting parties was armed and in a position to intimidate both their political rivals as well as voters and election officials.

Adding to this problem was the fact that the TMVP was contesting in alliance with the government, which put the system of checks and balances on electoral malpractice into jeopardy. There were numerous complaints from contesting parties of police and administrative inaction in the face of their complaints that a significant level of intimidation had obstructed their electoral campaigns. There were allegations that the TMVP had been intimidating its political rivals. The very low level of campaigning by rival parties in some parts of the east was independently verified by election monitors and the media.

An idea of the situation that prevailed during the period of the elections can be gleaned from the following excerpt of a PAFFREL election monitoring report.

“A fear psychosis had spread all over the Eastern Province. (especially in Batticaloa District); The presence in the area of an armed group, the TMVP, which had associated itself with the government in liberating the Eastern Province from the LTTE control, their activities with a special authority, and the fact that they were also contesting the polls; Unduly influencing public opinion by the government by starting new economic development programmes which should not be done during a period of an election and against the election laws; Having radio broadcasting and television programmes targeted to the Eastern Province by using primarily the state media; Eruption of various conflicts due to a large number of leaders and activists of various political parties going to the Eastern Province from Colombo and other areas, residing there temporarily and engaging in electioneering activities with their supporters; Obstruction to the performance of duties by police and other administrative authorities due to ruling politicians interfering in activities in connection with the election; Due to various obstructions including intimidation, some political parties could not deploy polling agents at some of the polling stations.”

SAME CALLING

In the aftermath of the eastern election there is a need for re-thinking on the part of those who oppose the government and its strategy of conflict resolution. Whether the easterners who voted in favour of the government at these flawed elections were a majority or not, it is clear that a significant proportion of the Tamil and Muslim voters in the east did cast their votes in favour of the government. This means that they do not see a viable alternative to the government, or that they support the government’s policies, or both.

It appears that the government’s success is based on a winning formula that incorporates at least three factors, these being patronage, strong arm tactics and the LTTE. The legitimacy of the strong arm tactics used by the government is intertwined with the presence of the LTTE and its seemingly unending appetite to engage in violence. The TMVP has retained its arms on the basis that they will be killed off by the LTTE if they are disarmed. But as a result of being an armed group, the TMVP was able to intimidate and threaten the electorate at the elections. As the TMVP was the electoral partner of the government, the security forces found themselves disempowered in fulfilling their legitimate duties by the people. The vast majority of complaints on election day were against the TMVP.

The government’s willingness to use patronage was another factor that was obvious at these elections. Virtually the entire cabinet, along with deputy ministers, numbering over a hundred were reported to be present campaigning on the ground. Another feature of these elections that detracted from the standard of free and fair elections was the misuse of state property to take forward the government’s election campaign. State vehicles and buildings, including schools and rest houses belonging to various government departments were blatantly utilized for the election campaign. The ministers swarmed around like busy bees inaugurating dozens of economic development projects during the election period.

The government’s campaign strategy may be costing the country dearly in terms of economic logic and political morality. But it shows results that matter most to politicians, which is the vote of the electorate. It also appears from public opinion polls that the majority of people are prepared to go on bearing the terrible cost of the war for the sake of defeating the LTTE once and for all, as promised by the government. It is ironic that the LTTE should provide the justification to the government in regard to its prioritization of a military solution at any cost. Until the LTTE is influenced to change course, the dynamic of war, propaganda and sacrifice is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.

Those who believe that the government’s high cost strategy is not viable in the longer term nevertheless face an uphill task in the present time. Their stance that conflict resolution requires respect for human rights and a political solution that is offered in negotiations to the LTTE are not being supported by the outcomes of the electoral process. This situation will be especially discouraging to the opposition political parties that have been dealt yet another defeat. They will need to rethink their strategy to capture political power. But for those whose vocation is peace and human rights, and not political power, their calling remains the same.

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